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Abstract: This chapter studies emerging cyber attacks on reinforcement
learning (RL) and introduces a quantitative approach to analyze the vulner-
abilities of RL. Focusing on adversarial manipulation on the cost signals, we
analyze the performance degradation of Temporal Difference (TD) learning
and Q-learning algorithms under the manipulation. For TD learning, the
approximation learned from the manipulated costs has an approximation
error bounded by a constant times the magnitude of the attack. The effect
of the adversarial attacks on the bound does not depend on the choice of
λ, the weighting factor. In Q-learning, we show that Q-learning algorithms
converge under stealthy attacks and bounded falsifications on cost signals.
We characterize the relation between the falsified cost and the Q-factors as
well as the policy learned by the learning agent which provides fundamen-
tal limits for feasible offensive and defensive moves. We propose a robust
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region in terms of the cost within which the adversary can never achieve
the targeted policy. We provide conditions on the falsified cost which can
mislead the agent to learn an adversary’s favored policy. A case study of
TD learning is provided to corroborate the results.
Keywords: Reinforcement Learning,Q-Learning, TD-Learning, Deception
and Counterdeception, Adversarial Learning.
Reinforcement learning (RL) is a powerful paradigm for online decision-
making in unknown environment. Recently, many advanced RL algorithms
have been developed and applied to various scenarios including video games
(e.g., Mnih et al. [2015]), transportation (e.g., Arel et al. [2010]), network secu-
rity (e.g., Huang and Zhu [2019a], Zhu and Bas¸ar [2009]), robotics (e.g., Kober
et al. [2013]) and critical infrastructures (e.g., Ernst et al. [2004]). However,
the implementation of RL techniques requires accurate and consistent feedback
from environment. It is straightforward to fulfill this requirement in simula-
tion while in practice, accurate and consistent feedback from the environment
is not guaranteed, especially in the presence of adversarial interventions. For
example, adversaries can manipulate cost signals by performing data injec-
tion attack and prevent an agent from receiving cost signals by jamming the
communication channel. With inconsistent and/or manipulated feedback from
environment, the RL algorithm can either fail to learn a policy or misled to a
pernicious policy. The failure of RL algorithms under adversarial intervention
can lead to a catastrophe to the system where the RL algorithm has been ap-
plied. For example, self-driving platooning vehicles can collide with each other
when their observation data are manipulated (see Behzadan and Munir [2019]);
drones equipped with RL techniques can be weaponized by terrorists to create
chaotic and vicious situations where they are commanded to collide to a crowd
or a building (see Huang and Zhu [2019b], Xu and Zhu [2015]).
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Hence, it is imperative to study RL with maliciously intermittent or ma-
nipulated feedback under adversarial intervention. First, it is important to
understand the adversarial behaviors of the attacker. To do so, one has to
establish a framework that characterizes the objective of the attacker, the ac-
tions available to the attacker and the information at his disposal. Secondly, it
is also crucial to understand the impacts of the attacks on RL algorithms. The
problems include how to measure the impacts, how to analyze the behavior of
the RL algorithms under different types of attacks and how to mathematically
and/or numerically compute the results of RL algorithms under attack. With
the understanding of the adversarial behavior and the impacts of the adver-
sarial behavior on RL algorithms, the third is to design defense mechanisms
that can protect RL algorithms from being degenerated. This could be done by
designing robust and secure RL algorithms that can automatically detect and
discard corrupted feedback, deploying cryptographic techniques to ensure con-
fidentiality, integrity and building backup communication channels to ensure
availability.
Despite the importance of understanding RL in malicious setting, very few
works have studied RL with maliciously manipulated feedback or intermittent
feedback. One type of related works studies RL algorithms under corrupted
reward signals (see Everitt et al. [2017], Wang et al. [2018]). In Everitt et al.
[2017], the authors investigate RL problems where agents receive false rewards
from environment. Their results show that reward corruption can impede the
performance of agents, and can result in disastrous consequences for highly
intelligent agents. Another type of work studies delayed evaluative feedback
signals without the presence of malicious adversaries (see Tan et al. [2008],
Watkins [1989]). The study of RL under malicious attacks from a security point
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of view appeared in the recent past (Huang and Zhu [2019b], Ma et al. [2019],
Lin et al. [2017], Behzadan and Munir [2018]). In Huang and Zhu [2019b], the
authors study RL under malicious falsification on cost signals and introduces
a quantitative framework of attack models to understand the vulnerabilities
of RL. Ma et al. focuses on security threats on batch RL and control where
attacker aims to poison the learned policy (Ma et al. [2019]). Lin et al. [2017]
and Behzadan and Munir [2018] focus on deep RL which involves deep natural
networks (DNNs) for function approximation.
In this chapter, we first introduce RL techniques built on a Markov decision
process framework and provide self contained background on RL before we dis-
cuss security problems of RL. Among RL techniques, of particular interest to
us are two frequently used learning algorithms: TD learning and Q-learning.
We then introduce general security concerns and problems in the field of RL.
Security concerns arise from the fact that RL technique requires accurate and
consistent feedback from environment, timely deployed controls and reliable
agents, which are hard to guarantee under the presence of adversarial attacks.
The discussion of general security concerns in this chapter invokes a large num-
ber of interesting problems yet to be done. In this chapter, we focus on one
particular type of problems where the cost signals that the RL agent receives
are falsified or manipulated as a result of adversarial attacks. In this particular
type of problems, a general formulation of attack models is discussed by defin-
ing the objectives, information structure and the capability of the adversary.
We analyze the attacks on both TD learning and Q-learning algorithms. We
develop important results that tell the fundamental limits of the adversarial at-
tacks. For TD learning, we characterize the bound on the approximation error
that can be induced by the adversarial attacks on the cost signals. The choice
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of λ does not impact the bound of the induced approximation error. In the
Q-learning scenario, we aim to address two fundamental questions. The first is
to understand the impact of the falsification of cost signals on the convergence
of Q-learning algorithm. The second is to understand how the RL algorithm
can be misled under the malicious falsifications. This chapter ends with an
educational example that explains how the adversarial attacks on cost signals
can affect the learning results in TD learning.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Sec. 1.1 gives a basic intro-
duction of Markov decision process and RL techniques with a focus on TD(λ)
learning and Q-learning. In Sec. 1.2, we discuss general security concerns and
problems in the field of RL. A particular type of attacks on the cost signals is
studied on both TD(λ) learning and Q-learning in Sec. 1.3. Sec. 1.4 comes an
educational example that illustrates the adversarial attacks on TD(λ) learning.
Conclusions and future works are included in Sec. 1.5.
1.1. Introduction of Reinforcement Learn-
ing
Consider an RL agent interacts with an unknown environment and attempts
to find the optimal policy minimizing the received cumulative costs. The en-
vironment is formalized as a Markov Decision Process (MDP) denoted by
〈S,A, g, P, α〉. The MDP has a finite state space denoted by S. Without loss of
generality, we assume that there are n states and S = {1, 2, · · · , n}. The state
transition depends on a control. The control space is also finite and denoted
by A. When at state i, the control must be chosen from a given finite subset of
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A denoted by U(i). At state i, the choice of a control u ∈ U(i) determines the
transition probability pij(u) to the next state j. The state transition informa-
tion is encoded in P . The agent receives a running cost that accumulates addi-
tively over time and depends on the states visited and the controls chosen. At
the kth transition, the agent incurs a cost αkg(i, u, j), where g : S×A×S → R
is a given real-valued function that describes the cost associated with the states
visited and the control chosen, and α ∈ (0, 1] is a scalar called the discount
factor.
The agent is interested in policies, i.e., sequences pi = {µ0, µ1, · · · } where
µk : S → A, k = 0, 1, · · · , is a function mapping states to controls with
µk(i) ∈ U(i) for all states i. Denote ik the state at time k. Once a policy
pi is fixed, the sequence of states ik becomes a Markov chain with transition
probabilities P (ik+1 = j|ik = i) = pij(µk(i)). In this chapter, we consider infi-
nite horizon problems, where the cost accumulates indefinitely. In the infinite
horizon problem, the total expected cost starting from an initial state i and
using a policy pi = {µ0, µ1, · · · } is
Jpi(i) = lim
N→∞
E
[
N∑
k=0
αkg (ik, µk(ik), ik+1)
∣∣∣∣∣ i0 = i
]
,
the expected value is taken with respect to the probability distribution of the
Markov chain {i0, i1, i2, · · · }. This distribution depends on the initial state i0
and the policy pi. The optimal cost-to-go starting from state i is denoted by
J∗(i); that is,
J∗(i) = min
pi
Jpi(i).
We can view the costs J∗(i), i = 1, 2, · · · , as the components of a vector
J∗ ∈ Rn. Of particular interest in the infinite-horizon problem are station-
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ary policies, which are policies of the form pi = {µ, µ, · · · }. The corresponding
cost-to-go vector is denoted by Jµ ∈ Rn.
The optimal infinite-horizon cost-to-go functions J∗(i), i = 1, 2, 3, · · · , also
known as value functions, arise as a central component of algorithms as well
as performance metrics in many statistics and engineering applications. Com-
putation of the value functions relies on solving a system of equations
J∗(i) = min
u∈U(i)
n∑
j=1
pij(u)(g(i, u, j) + αJ
∗(j)), i = 1, 2, · · · , n, (1.1)
referred to as Bellman’s equation (Bertsekas and Tsitsiklis [1996], Sutton et al.
[1998]), which will be at the center of analysis and algorithms in RL. If µ(i)
attains the minimum in the right-hand side of Bellman’s equation (1.1) for
each i, then the stationary policy µ should be optimal (Bertsekas and Tsitsiklis
[1996]). That is, for each i ∈ S,
µ∗(i) = arg min
µ(i)∈U(i)
n∑
j=1
pij (µ(i)) (g(i, µ(i), j) + αJ
∗(j)) .
The efficient computation or approximation of J∗ and an optimal policy
µ∗ is the major concern of RL. In MDP problems where the system model is
known and the state space is reasonably large, value iteration, policy iteration,
and linear programming are the general approaches to find the value function
and the optimal policy. Readers unfamiliar with these approaches can refer to
Chapter 2 of Bertsekas and Tsitsiklis [1996].
It is well-known that RL refers to a collection of techniques for solving
MDP under two practical issues. One is the overwhelming computational re-
quirements of solving Bellman’s equations because of a colossal amount of
states and controls, which is often referred to as Bellman’s “curse of dimen-
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sionality”. In such situations, an approximation method is necessary to obtain
sub-optimal solutions. In approximation methods, we replace the value func-
tion J∗ with a suitable approximation J˜(r), where r is a vector of parameters
which has much lower dimension than J∗. There are two main function approxi-
mation architectures: linear and nonlinear approximations. The approximation
architecture is linear if J˜(r) is linear in r. Otherwise, the approximation archi-
tecture is nonlinear. Frequently used nonlinear approximation methods include
polynomials based approximation, wavelet based approximation, and approxi-
mation using neural network. The topic of deep reinforcement learning studies
the cases where approximation J˜(r) is represented by a deep neural network
(Mnih et al. [2015]).
Another issue comes from the unavailability of the environment dynamics;
i.e., the transition probability is either unknown or too complex to be kept in
memory. In this circumstance, one alternative is to simulate the system and the
cost structure. With given state space S and the control space A, a simulator
or a computer that generates a state trajectory using the probabilistic transi-
tion from any given state i to a generated successor state j for a given control
u. This transition accords with the transition probabilities pij(u), which is not
necessarily known to the simulator or the computer. Another alternative is to
attain state trajectories and corresponding costs through experiments. Both
methods allow the learning agent to observe their own behavior to learn how
to make good decisions. It is clearly feasible to use repeated simulations to
find the approximate of the transition model of the system P and the cost
functions g by averaging the observed costs. This approach is usually referred
to as model-based RL. As an alternative, in model-free RL, transition prob-
abilities are not explicitly estimated, but instead the value function or the
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approximated value function of a given policy is progressively calculated by
generating several sample system trajectories and associated costs. Of particu-
lar interest to us in this chapter is the security of model-free RL. This is because
firstly, model-free RL approaches are the most widely applicable and practical
approaches that have been extensively investigated and implemented; secondly,
model-free RL approaches receive observations or data from environment suc-
cessively and consistently. This makes model-free RL approaches vulnerable to
attacks. An attack can induce an accumulative impact on succeeding learning
process. The most frequently used algorithms in RL are TD learning algo-
rithms and Q-learning algorithms. Hence, in this chapter, we will focus on the
security problems of these two learning algorithms as well as their approximate
counterparts.
1.1.1. TD Learning
Temporal difference (TD) learning is an implementation of the Monte Carlo
policy evaluation algorithm that incrementally updates the cost-to-go estimates
of a given policy µ, which is an important sub-class of general RL methods.
TD learning algorithms, introduced in many references, including Bertsekas
and Tsitsiklis [1996], Sutton et al. [1998] and Tsitsiklis and Van Roy [1997],
generates an infinitely long trajectory of the Markov Chain {i0, i1, i2, · · · } from
simulator or experiments by fixing a policy µ, and at time t iteratively updates
the current estimate Jµt of J
µ using an iteration that depends on a fixed scalar
λ ∈ [0, 1], and on the temporal difference
dt(ik, ik+1) = g(ik, ik+1) + αJ
µ
t (ik+1)− Jµt (ik), ∀t = 0, 1, · · · ,∀k ≤ t.
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The incremental updates of TD(λ) have many variants. In the most straight-
forward implementation of TD(λ), all of the updates are carried out simultane-
ously after the entire trajectory has been simulated. This is called the off-line
version of the algorithm. On the contrary, in the on-line implementation of
the algorithm, the estimates update once at each transition. Under our dis-
count MDP, a trajectory may never end. If we use an off-line variant of TD(λ),
we may have to wait infinitely long before a complete trajectory is obtained.
Hence, in this chapter, we focus on an on-line variant. The update equation
for this case becomes
Jµt+1(i) = J
µ
t (i) + γt(i)zt(i)dt(i), ∀i, (1.2)
where the γt(i) are non-negative stepsize coefficients and zt(i) is the eligibility
coefficients defined as
zt(i) =

αλzt−1(i), if it 6= i,
αλzt−1(i) + 1, if it = i.
This definition of eligibility coefficients gives the every-visit TD(λ) method. In
every-visit TD(λ) method, if a state is visited more than once by the same
trajectory, the update should also be carried out more than once.
Under a very large number of states or controls, we have to resort to ap-
proximation methods. Here, we introduce TD(λ) with linear approximation
architectures. We consider a linear parametrization of the form:
J˜(i, r) =
K∑
k=1
r(k)φk(i).
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Here, r = (r(1), . . . , r(K)) is a vector of tunable parameters and φk(·) are
fixed scalar functions defined on the state space. The form can be written in a
compact form:
J˜(r) = (J˜(1, r), . . . , J˜(n, r)) = Φr,
where
Φ =

| |
φ1 · · · φK
| |
 =

— φ′(1) —
· · · · · · · · ·
— φ′(n) —
 ,
with φk = (φk(1), . . . , φk(n)) and φ(i) = (φ1(i), . . . , φK(i)). We assume that Φ
has linearly independent columns. Otherwise, some components of r would be
redundant.
Let ηt be the eligibility vector for the approximated TD(λ) problem which
is of dimension K. With this notation, the approximated TD(λ) updates are
given by
rt+1 = rt + γtdtηt, (1.3)
where
ηt+1 = αληt + φ(it+1). (1.4)
Here, dt = g(it, it+1) + αr
′
tφ(it+1)− r′tφ(it).
The almost-sure convergence of rt generated by (1.3) and (1.4) is guaran-
teed if the conditions in Assumption 6.1 in Bertsekas and Tsitsiklis [1996] hold.
It will converge to the solution of
Ar + b = 0,
where A = Φ′D(M − I)Φ and b = Φ′Dq. Here, D is a diagonal matrix with
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diagonal entries d(1), d(2), · · · , d(n), and d(i) is the steady-state probability of
state i; the matrix M is given by M = (1 − λ)∑∞m=0 λm(αPµ)m+1 and the
vector b is given by b = Φ′Dq with q =
∑∞
m=0(αλPµ)
mg¯, where g¯ is a vector
in Rn whose ith component is given by g¯(i) =
∑n
j=1 pij(µ(i))g(i, µ(i), j). The
matrix Pµ is the transition matrix defined by Pµ := [Pµ]i,j = pij(µ(i)). A
detailed proof of the convergence is provided in Tsitsiklis and Van Roy [1997]
and Bertsekas and Tsitsiklis [1996].
Indeed, TD(λ) with linear approximations is a much more general frame-
work. The convergence of Jµt in TD(λ) without approximation follows imme-
diately if we let K = n and Φ = In where In is n× n identity matrix.
1.1.2. Q-Learning
Q-learning method is initially proposed in Watkins and Dayan [1992] which up-
dates estimates of the Q-factors associated with an optimal policy. Q-learning
is proven to be an efficient computational method that can be used whenever
there is no explicit model of the system and the cost structure. First, we in-
troduce the first notion of the Q-factor of a state-control pair (i, u), defined
as
Q(i, u) =
n∑
j=0
pij(u)(g(i, u, j) + αJ(j)). (1.5)
The optimal Q-factor Q∗(i, u) corresponding to a pair (i, u) is defined by (1.5)
with J(j) replaced by J∗(j). It follows immediately from Bellman’s equation
that
Q∗(i, u) =
n∑
j=0
pij(u)
(
g(i, u, j) + α min
v∈U(j)
Q∗(j, v)
)
. (1.6)
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Indeed, the optimal Q-factors Q∗(i, u) are the unique solution of the above
system by Banach fixed-point theorem (see Kreyszig [1978]).
Basically, Q-learning computes the optimal Q-factors based on samples
in the absence of system model and cost structure. It updates the Q-factors
following
Qt+1(i, u) = (1− γt)Qt(i, u) + γt
(
g(i, u, i¯) + α min
v∈U (¯i)
Qt(¯i, v)
)
, (1.7)
where the successor state i¯ and g(i, u, i¯) is generated from the pair (i, u) by
simulation or experiments, i.e., according to the transition probabilities pi¯i(u).
For more intuition and interpretation about Q-learning algorithm, one can
refer to Chapter 5 of Bertsekas and Tsitsiklis [1996], Sutton et al. [1998] and
Watkins and Dayan [1992].
If we assume that stepsize γt satisfies
∑∞
t=0 γt =∞ and
∑∞
t=0 γ
2
t <∞, we
obtain the convergence of Qt(i, u) generated by (1.7) to the optimal Q-factors
Q∗(i, u). A detailed proof of convergence in provided in Borkar and Meyn [2000]
and Chapter 5 of Bertsekas and Tsitsiklis [1996].
1.2. Security Problems of Reinforcement
Learning
Understanding adversarial attacks on RL systems is essential to develop effec-
tive defense mechanisms and an important step toward trustworthy and safe
RL. The reliable implementation of RL techniques usually requires accurate
and consistent feedback from the environment, precisely and timely deployed
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Figure 1.1: Attacks on RL systems: Adversaries can manipulate actions, costs, and
state signals in the feedback system. Agents can also be compromised in the learning
process.
controls to the environment and reliable agents (in multi-agent RL cases). Lack-
ing any one of the three factors will render failure to learn optimal decisions.
These factors can be used by adversaries as gateways to penetrate RL systems.
It is hence of paramount importance to understand and predict general adver-
sarial attacks on RL systems targeted at the three doorways. In these attacks,
the miscreants know that they are targeting RL systems, and therefore, they
tailor their attack strategy to mislead the learning agent. Hence, it is natural
to start with understanding the parts of RL that adversaries can target at.
Fig. 1.1 illustrates different types of attacks on the RL system. One type of
attack aims at the state which is referred to as state attacks. Attacks on state
signals can happen if the remote sensors in the environment are compromised
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or the communication channel between the agent and the sensors is jammed
or corrupted. In such circumstances, the learning agent may receive a false
state observation i˜k of the actual state ik at time k and/or may receive a
delayed observation of the actual state or even never receive any information
regarding the state at time k. An example of effortless state attacks is sequential
blinding/blurring of the cameras in a deep RL-based autonomous vehicle via
lasers/dirts on lens, which can lead to learning false policies and hence lead
to catastrophic consequences. Based on its impact on the RL systems, state
attacks can be classified into two groups: i) Denial of Service (DoS); and ii)
integrity attacks. The main purpose of DoS attacks is to deny access to sensor
information. Integrity attacks are characterized by the modification of sensor
information, compromising their integrity.
Another type of attacks targets at cost signals. In this type of attacks, the
adversary aims to corrupt the cost signals that the learning agent has received
with a malicious purpose of misleading the agent. Instead of receiving the
actual cost signal gk = g(ik, uk, jk+1) at time k, the learning agent receives a
manipulated or falsified cost signal g˜k. The corruption of cost signals comes
from the false observation of the state in cases where the cost is predetermined
by the learning agent. In other cases where cost signals are provided directly
by the environment or a remote supervisor, the cost signal can be corrupted
independently from the observation of the state. The learning agent receives
falsified cost signals even when the observation of the state is accurate. In
the example of autonomous vehicle, if the cost depends on the distance of the
deep RL agent to a destination as measure by GPS coordinates, spoofing of
GPS signals by the adversary may result in incorrect reward signals, which can
translate to incorrect navigation policies (See Behzadan and Munir [2018]).
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The corruption of cost signals may lead to a doomed policies. For example,
Clark and Amodei [2016] has trained an RL agent on a boat racing game. High
observed reward misleads the agent to go repeatedly in a circle in a small lagoon
and hit the same targets, while losing every race. Or even worse, the learning
agent may be misled to lethal policies that would result in self-destruction.
The learning agent influences the environment by performing control u via
actuators. There is a type of attacks targeting the actuators. If the actuator
is exposed to the adversary, the control performed will be different than the
one determined by the agent. Hence, during the learning process, the agent
will learn a deteriorated transition kernel and a matched reward function.
An example of this type of attack is RL-based unmanned aerial vehicles may
receive corrupted control signals which would cause malfunctioning of its servo
actuators.
To understand an attack model, one needs to specify three ingredients: ob-
jective of an adversary, actions available to the adversary, and information at
his disposal. The objective of an adversary describes the goal the adversary
aims to achieve out of the attacks. Objectives of an adversary include but not
limit to maximizing the agent’s accumulative costs, misleading the agent to
learn certain policies, or diverging the agent’s learning algorithm. To achieve
the objective, adversaries need a well-crafted strategy. An attack strategy is
developed based on the information and the actions at his disposal. An at-
tack strategy is a map from the information space to the action space. The
information structure of the adversary describes the knowledge the adversaries
have during the learning and the attack process. Whether the adversaries know
which learning algorithms the agent implements, whether the adversaries know
the actual state trajectory, controls and costs are decisive for the adversaries
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to choose their strategies. The scope of the attack strategy also depends on
the actions at the adversary’s disposal. Due to adversaries’ capabilities, ad-
versaries can only launch certain attacks. For example, some adversaries can
only manipulate the costs induced at certain states or add white noise to the
observations.
In next section, we focus on cases where adversaries target at the cost
signals received by the agent. We analyze the performance of TD learning and
Q-learning under manipulated costs, respectively, and provide fundamental
limits under the attacks on cost signals.
1.3. Reinforcement Learning with Ma-
nipulated Cost Signals
Under malicious attacks on cost signals as we have discussed in Sec. 1.2, the
RL agent will fail to observe the actual cost feedback from the environment.
Instead, the agent receives a cost signal that might be falsified by the adversary.
Consider the following MDP with falsified cost denoted by 〈S,A, g, g˜, P, α〉.
Under the falsification, the agent, instead of receiving the actual cost signal
gt ∈ R at the t-th update, observes a falsified cost signal denoted by g˜t ∈ R.
The remaining aspects of the MDP framework stay the same. The adversary’s
task here is to design falsified cost signals g˜ based on his information structure
and the actions available to him so that he can achieve certain objectives.
Suppose the adversary is an insider and he knows what the agent knows at
time t. In other words, at time t, the adversary knows the state trajectory, the
control trajectory and the cost signals up to time t. The adversary may or may
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not know the system model. Suppose that the adversary falsifies the cost signals
in a stealthy way. In this case, the cost associated with each state-control-state
triple is consistently falsified in the same way. The following definition gives a
formal definition of the attack.
Definition 1.1: (Stealthy Attacks) If g˜t takes the same value for the same
state-control-state triple for all t; i.e., for t 6= τ , we have g˜t = g˜τ if (it, ut, jt+1) =
(iτ , uτ , jτ+1), then we say the attacks on the cost signals are stealthy.
Under stealthy attacks, the falsified cost signals can be given by a function
g˜ : S × A × S → R. Then, at time t, the falsified cost the agent receives is
g˜t = g˜(it, ut, it+1). Since the transition from it to it+1 depends on the transi-
tion probability, without loss of generality, we consider only the cost structure
defined on the state-control pair, i.e., g(i, u) for i ∈ S, u ∈ A.
1.3.1. TD Learning with Manipulated Cost Sig-
nals
If the RL agent updates the estimates of the cost-to-go function of a given
policy µ according to (1.3) and (1.4), then under the stealthy attacks, the
algorithm can be written as
r˜t+1 = r˜t + γtd˜tηt,
ηt+1 = αληt + φ(it+1),
(1.8)
where d˜t = g˜(it, ut) + αr˜
′
tφ(it+1)− r˜′tφ(it).
Suppose the sequence of parameters {r˜t} generated by (1.8) under the
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falsified cost signals is convergent and converges to r˜∗. (We will show the
conditions under which the convergence of {r˜t} is guaranteed.) Let r∗ be the
solution of Ar+b. In TD(λ), the agent aims to estimate the cost-to-go function
Jµ of a given policy µ. In approximated TD(λ) with linear approximation
architecture, J˜(i, r) = φ′(i)r serves as an approximation of Jµ(i) for i ∈ S.
One objective of the adversary can be to deteriorate the approximation and
estimation of Jµ by manipulating the costs. One way to achieve the objective
is to let r˜t generated by (1.8) converge to r˜
∗ such that Φ′r˜∗ is as a worse
approximate of Jµ as possible.
Lemma 1.1: If the sequence of parameters {r˜t} is generated by the TD(λ)
learning algorithm (1.8) with stealthy and bounded attacks on the cost signals,
then the sequence {r˜t} converges to r˜∗ and r˜∗ is a unique solution of Ar+ b˜ =
0, where b˜ = Φ′D
∑∞
m=0(αλPµ)
mg˜ and g˜ is vector whose i-th component is
g˜(i, µ(i)).
The proof of Lemma 1.1 follows the proof of Proposition 6.4 in Bertsekas
and Tsitsiklis [1996] with g(i, µ(i), j) replaced by g˜(i, µ(i)). If the adversary
performs stealthy and bounded attacks, he can mislead the agent to learn an
approximation Φ′r˜∗ of Jµ. The distance between Φ′r˜∗ and Jµ with respect
a norm ‖ · ‖ is what the adversary aims to maximize. The following lemma
provides an upper bound of the distance between Φ′r˜∗ and Jµ.
Lemma 1.2: Suppose that r˜∗ is the parameters learned from the manipulated
TD(λ) (1.8). Then, the approximation error under the manipulated satisfies
‖Φ′r˜∗−Jµ‖D ≤ ‖Φ′r˜∗−Φ′r∗‖D+ 1− λα√
(1− α)(1 + α− 2λα)‖(Π−I)J
µ‖D, (1.9)
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where ‖ · ‖D is the weighted quadratic norm defined by ‖J‖2D = J ′DJ =∑n
i=1 d(i)J(i)
2 and Π = Φ(Φ′DΦ)−1Φ′D.
Proof. A direct application of triangle inequality gives us
‖Φ′r˜∗ − Jµ‖ = ‖Φ′r˜∗ − Φ′r∗ + Φ′r∗ − Jµ‖ ≤ ‖Φ′r˜∗ − Φ′r∗‖+ ‖Φ′r∗ − Jµ‖.
This indicates that the distance between Φ′r˜∗ and Jµ is bounded by the dis-
tance between the falsified approximation Φ′r˜∗ of Jµ and the true approxima-
tion Φ′r∗ of Jµ plus the approximation error ‖Φ′r∗ − Jµ‖. Moreover, we know
from Theorem 1 in Tsitsiklis and Van Roy [1997] that
‖Φ′r∗ − Jµ‖D ≤ 1− λα√
(1− α)(1 + α− 2λα) minr ‖Φ
′r − Jµ‖D. (1.10)
From Lemma 6.8, we know there exists Π = Φ(Φ′DΦ)−1Φ′D such that for
every vector J , we have ‖ΠJ − J‖D = minr ‖Φr − J‖D. Hence, we arrive at
‖Φ′r˜∗ − Jµ‖D ≤ ‖Φ′r˜∗ − Φ′r∗‖D + 1− λα√
(1− α)(1 + α− 2λα)‖(Π− I)J
µ‖D.
Note that ‖(Π− I)Jµ‖ can be further bounded by ‖(Π− I)Jµ‖ = ‖Jµ‖ −
‖ΠJµ‖ ≤ ‖Jµ‖. But (1.9) provides a tighter bound. From (1.10), we know that
for the case λ = 1, the TD(λ) algorithm under the true costs (1.3) and (1.4)
gives the best approximation of Jµ, i.e., Φ′r∗ = ΠJµ and ‖Φ′r∗ − Jµ‖D =
minr ‖Φ′r − Jµ‖D. As λ decreases, (1− αλ)/
√
(1− α)(1 + α− 2λα) increases
and the bound deteriorates. The worst bound, namely, ‖(Π− I)Jµ‖/√1− α2
is obtained when λ = 0. Although the result provides a bound, it suggests that
in the worst-case scenario, as λ decreases, the TD(λ) under costs manipulation
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can suffer higher approximation error. From Lemma 1.10, we know that the
manipulation of the costs has no impact on the second part of the bound which
is (1−λα)‖(Π−I)Jµ‖D/
√
(1− α)(1 + α− 2λα). In the following theorem, we
analyze how much ‖Φ′(r˜∗ − r∗)‖D will change under a bounded manipulation
of the costs.
Theorem 1.1: Suppose the manipulation of the costs is given by η ∈ Rn
where η(i) = g˜(i, µ(i)) − g(i, µ(i)) for i ∈ S. Then, the distance between the
manipulated TD(λ) estimate and the true TD(λ) estimate of Jµ satisfies
‖Φ′r˜∗ − Φ′r∗‖D ≤ 1
1− α‖η‖D,
and the approximation error of Φ′r˜∗ satisfies
‖Φ′r˜∗− Jµ‖D ≤ ‖ 1
1− α‖η‖D +
1− λα√
(1− α)(1 + α− 2λα)‖(Π− I)J
µ‖D. (1.11)
Proof. Note that r˜∗ and r∗ satisfies Ar˜∗ + b˜ = 0 and Ar∗ + b = 0 where
b = Φ′D
∑∞
m=0(αλPµ)
mg¯. Here, g¯ is vector whose i-th component is g(i, µ(i)).
Then, we have A(r˜∗ − r∗) + b˜− b = 0 which implies (because Φ′D is of full
rank)
MΦ(r˜∗ − r∗) +
∞∑
m=0
(αλPµ)
m(g˜ − g¯) = Φ(r˜∗ − r∗).
Applying ‖ · ‖D on both side of the equation, we obtain
‖MΦ(r˜∗ − r∗)‖D + ‖
∞∑
m=0
(αλPµ)
mη‖D = ‖Φ(r˜∗ − r∗)‖.
From Lemma 6.4 in Bertsekas and Tsitsiklis [1996], we know that for any
J ∈ Rn, we have ‖PµJ‖D ≤ ‖J‖. From this, it easily follows that ‖Pmµ J‖D ≤
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‖J‖D. Note thatM = (1−λ)
∑∞
m=0 λ
m(αPµ)
m+1. Using the triangle inequality,
we obtain
‖MJ‖D ≤ (1− λ)
∞∑
m=0
λmαm+1‖J‖D = α(1− λ)
1− αλ ‖J‖D.
Hence, we have
‖
∞∑
m=0
(αλPµ)
mη‖D ≥ 1− α
1− αλ‖Φ(r˜
∗ − r∗)‖.
Moreover, we can see that
‖
∞∑
m=0
(αλPµ)
mη‖D ≤ ‖
∞∑
m=0
(αλPµ)
m‖D‖η‖D ≤
∞∑
m=0
(αλ)m‖η‖D = 1
1− αλ‖η‖D,
which indicates that
1
1− αλ‖η‖D ≥
1− α
1− αλ‖Φ(r˜
∗ − r∗)‖D.
Thus, we have
‖Φ(r˜∗ − r∗)‖D ≤ 1
1− α‖η‖D.
Together with Lemma 1.2, we have
‖Φ′r˜∗ − Jµ‖D ≤ 1
1− α‖η‖D +
1− λα√
(1− α)(1 + α− 2λα)‖(Π− I)J
µ‖D.
The distance between the true TD(λ) approximator Φ′r∗ and the manipu-
lated TD(λ) approximator Φ′r˜∗ is actually bounded by a constant term times
the distance of the true cost and the manipulated cost. And the constant term
1/(1−α) does not depend on λ. This means the choice of λ by the agent does
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not affect the robustness of the TD(λ) algorithm. This means in the worst-case
scenario, TD(λ) algorithms with different values of λ will suffer the same loss of
approximation accuracy. From (1.11), we can conclude that the approximation
error of the manipulated TD(λ) algorithm is bounded by the magnitude of the
costs manipulation and a fixed value decided by the value of λ, the choice of
basis Φ and the properties of the MDP.
1.3.2. Q-Learning with Manipulated Cost Sig-
nals
If the RL agent learns an optimal policy by Q-learning algorithm given in (1.7),
then under stealthy attacks on cost, the algorithm can be written as
Q˜t+1(i, u) = (1− γt)Q˜t(i, u) + γt
(
g˜(i, u) + α min
v∈U (¯i)
Q˜t(¯i, v)
)
. (1.12)
Note that if the attacks are not stealthy, we need to write g˜t in lieu of g˜(it, at).
There are two important questions regarding the Q-learning algorithm with
falsified cost (1.12): (1) Will the sequence of Qt-factors converge? (2) Where
will the sequence of Qt converge to?
Suppose that the sequence Q˜t generated by the Q-learning algorithm (1.12)
converges. Let Q˜∗ be the limit, i.e., Q˜∗ = limn→∞ Q˜t. Suppose the objective
of an adversary is to induce the RL agent to learn a particular policy µ†. The
adversary’s problem then is to design g˜ by applying the actions available to
him based on the information he has so that the limit Q-factors learned from
the Q-learning algorithm produce the policy favored by the adversary µ†, i.e,
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Q˜∗ ∈ Vµ† , where
Vµ := {Q ∈ Rn×|A| : µ(i) = arg min
u
Q(i, u), ∀i ∈ S}.
In Q-learning algorithm (1.12), to guarantee almost sure convergence, the
agent usually takes tapering stepsize Borkar [2009] {γt} which satisfies 0 <
γt ≤ 1, t ≥ 0, and
∑
t γt = ∞,
∑
t γ
2
t < ∞. Suppose in our problem, the
agent takes tapering stepsize. To address the convergence issues, we have the
following result.
Lemma 1.3: If an adversary performs stealthy attacks with bounded g˜(i, a, j)
for all i, j ∈ S, a ∈ A, then the Q-learning algorithm with falsified costs con-
verges to the fixed point of F˜ (Q) almost surely where the mapping F˜ : Rn×|A| →
Rn×|A| is defined as F˜ (Q) = [F˜ii(Q)]i,i with
F˜iu(Q) = α
∑
j
pij(u) min
v
Q(j, v) + g˜(i, u, j),
and the fixed point is unique and denoted by Q˜∗.
The proof of Lemma 1.1 is included in Huang and Zhu [2019b]. It is not
surprising that one of the conditions given in Lemma 1.3 is that an attacker
performs stealthy attacks. The convergence can be guaranteed because the
falsified cost signals are consistent over time for each state action pair. The
uniqueness of Q˜∗ comes from the fact that if g˜(i, u) is bounded for every (i, u) ∈
S×A, F˜ is a contraction mapping. By Banach’s fixed point theorem Kreyszig
[1978], F˜ admits a unique fixed point. With this lemma, we conclude that
an adversary can make the algorithm converge to a limit point by stealthily
falsifying the cost signals.
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Remark 1.1: Whether an adversary aims for the convergence of the Q-
learning algorithm (1.12) or not depends on his objective. In our setting, the
adversary intends to mislead the RL agent to learn policy µ†, indicating that
the adversary promotes convergence and aim to have the limit point Q˜∗ lie in
Vµ† .
It is interesting to analyze, from the adversary’s perspective, how to falsify
the cost signals so that the limit point that algorithm (1.12) converges to is
favored by the adversary. In later discussions, we consider stealthy attacks
where the falsified costs are consistent for the same state action pairs. Denote
the true cost by matrix g ∈ Rn×|A| with [g]i,u = g(i, u) and the falsified cost is
described by a matrix g˜ ∈ Rn×|A| with [g˜]i,u = g˜(i, u). Given g˜, the fixed point
of F˜ is uniquely decided; i.e., the point that the algorithm (1.12) converges to
is uniquely determined. Thus, there is a mapping g˜ 7→ Q˜∗ implicitly described
by the relation F˜ (Q) = Q. For convenience, this mapping is denoted by f :
Rn×|A| → Rn×|A|.
Theorem 1.2(No Butterfly Effect): Let Q˜∗ denote the Q-factor learned
from algorithm (1.7) with falsified cost signals and Q∗ be the Q-factor learned
from (1.12) with true cost signals. There exists a constant L < 1 such that
‖Q˜∗ −Q∗‖ ≤ 1
1− L‖g˜ − g‖, (1.13)
and L = α.
The proof of Theorem 1.2 can be found in Huang and Zhu [2019b]. In fact,
taking this argument just slightly further, one can conclude that falsification
on cost g by a tiny perturbation does not cause significant changes in the
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limit point of algorithm (1.12), Q˜∗. This feature indicates that an adversary
cannot cause a significant change in the limit Q-factors by just applying a
small perturbation in the cost signals. This is a feature known as stability,
which is observed in problems that possess contraction mapping properties.
Also, Theorem 1.2 indicates that the mapping g˜ 7→ Q˜∗ is continuous, and to
be more specific, it is uniformly Lipschitz continuous with Lipschitz constant
1/(1− α).
With Theorem 1.2, we can characterize the minimum level of falsification
required to change the policy from the true optimal policy µ∗ to the policy µ†.
First, note that Vµ ⊂ Rn×|A| and it can also be written as
Vµ = {Q ∈ Rn×|A| : Q(i, µ(i)) < Q(i, u),∀i ∈ S, ∀u 6= µ(i)}. (1.14)
Second, for any two different policies µ1 and µ2, Vµ1 ∩ Vµ2 = ∅. Lemma 1.4
presents several important properties regarding the set Vµ.
Lemma 1.4: (a) For any given policy µ, Vµ is a convex set.
(b) For any two different policies µ1 and µ2, Vµ1 ∩ Vµ2 = ∅.
(c) The distance between any two different policies µ1 and µ2 defined as D(µ1, µ2) :=
infQ1∈Vµ1 ,Q2∈Vµ2 ‖Q1 −Q2‖ is zero.
Proof. (a) Suppose Q1, Q2 ∈ Vµ. We show for every λ ∈ [0, 1], λQ1 +
(1 − λ)Q2 ∈ Vµ. This is true because Q1(i, µ(i)) < Q1(i, u) and Q2(i, µ(i)) <
Q2(i, u) imply
λQ1(i, µ(i)) + (1− λ)Q2(i, µ(i)) < λQ1(i, u) + (1− λ)Q2(i, u),
for all i ∈ S, u 6= µ(i).
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(b) Suppose µ1 6= µ2 and Vµ1 ∩ Vµ2 is not empty. Then there exists Q ∈
Vµ1 ∩ Vµ2 . Since µ1 = µ2, there exists i such that µ1(i) 6= µ2(i). Let u = µ2.
Since Q ∈ Vµ1 , we have Q(i, µ1(i)) < Q(i, µ2(i)). Hence, Q /∈ Vµ2 , which is a
contradiction. Thus, Vµ1 ∩ Vµ2 = ∅.
(c) Suppose µ1 6= µ2. Construct Q1 as a matrix whose entries are all one
except Q(i, µ1(i)) = 1 − /2 for every i ∈ S where  > 0. Similarly, con-
struct Q2 as a matrix whose entries are all one except Q(i, µ2(i)) = 1 − /2
for every i ∈ S. It is easy to see that Q1 ∈ Vµ1 and Q2 ∈ Vµ2 . Then
infQ1∈Vµ1 ,Q2∈Vµ2 ‖Q1 − Q2‖∞ ≤ ‖Q1 − Q2‖∞ = . Since  can be arbitrar-
ily small, infQ1∈Vµ1 ,Q2∈Vµ2 ‖Q1 − Q2‖∞ = 0. Since norms are equivalent in
finite-dimensional space (see Sec. 2.4 in Kreyszig [1978]), we have D(µ1, µ2) =
infQ1∈Vµ1 ,Q2∈Vµ2 ‖Q1 −Q2‖ = 0.
Suppose the true optimal policy µ∗ and the adversary desired policy µ† are
different; otherwise, the optimal policy µ∗ is what the adversary desires, there
is no incentive for the adversary to attack. According to Lemma 1.4, D(µ∗, µ†)
is always zero. This counterintuitive result states that a small change in the Q-
value may result in any possible change of policy learned by the agent from the
Q-learning algorithm (1.12). Compared with Theorem 1.2 which is a negative
result to the adversary, this result is in favor of the adversary.
Define the point Q∗ to set Vµ† distance by DQ∗(µ†) := infQ∈Vµ† ‖Q−Q∗‖.
Thus, if Q˜∗ ∈ Vµ† , we have
0 = D(µ∗, µ†) ≤ DQ∗(µ†) ≤ ‖Q˜∗ −Q∗‖ ≤ 1
1− α‖g˜ − g‖, (1.15)
where the first inequality comes from the fact that Q∗ ∈ Vµ∗ and the second
inequality is due to Q˜∗ ∈ Vµ† . The inequalities give us the following theorem.
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Theorem 1.3(Robust Region): To make the agent learn the policy µ†, the
adversary has to manipulate the cost such that g˜ lies outside the ball B(g; (1−
α)DQ∗(µ
†)).
The robust region for the true cost g to the adversary’s targeted policy µ†
is given by B(g; (1−α)DQ∗(µ†)) which is an open ball with center c and radius
(1 − α)DQ∗(µ†). That means the attacks on the cost needs to be ‘powerful’
enough to drive the falsified cost g˜ outside the ball B(g; (1 − α)DQ∗(µ†)) to
make the RL agent learn the policy µ†. If the falsified cost g˜ is within the
ball, the RL agent can never learn the adversary’s targeted policy µ†. The ball
B(g; (1−α)DQ∗(µ†)) depends only on the true cost g and the adversary desired
policy µ† (Once the MDP is given, Q∗ is uniquely determined by g). Thus, we
refer this ball as the robust region of the true cost g to the adversarial policy
µ†. As we have mentioned, if the actions available to the adversary only allows
him to perform bounded falsification on cost signals and the bound is smaller
than the radius of the robust region, then the adversary can never mislead the
agent to learn policy µ†.
Remark 1.2: First, in discussions above, the adversary policy µ† can be
any possible polices and the discussion remains valid for any possible policies.
Second, set Vµ of Q-values is not just a convex set but also an open set. We
thus can see that DQ∗(µ
†) > 0 for any µ† 6= µ∗ and the second inequality in
(1.15) can be replaced by a strict inequality. Third, the agent can estimate his
own robustness to falsification if he can know the adversary desired policy µ†.
For attackers who have access to true cost signals and the system model, the
attacker can compute the robust region of the true cost to his desired policy
µ† to evaluate whether the objective is feasible or not. When it is not feasible,
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the attacker can consider changing his objectives, e.g., selecting other favored
policies that have a smaller robust region.
We have discussed how falsification affects the change of Q-factors learned
by the agent in a distance sense. The problem now is to study how to falsify the
true cost in a right direction so that the resulted Q-factors fall into the favored
region of an adversary. One difficulty of analyzing this problem comes from
the fact that the mapping g˜ 7→ Q˜∗ is not explicit known. The relation between
g˜ and g˜∗ is governed by the Q-learning algorithm (1.12). Another difficulty is
that due to the fact that both g˜ and Q˜∗ lies in the space of Rn×|A|, we need to
resort to Fre´chet derivative or Gaˆteaux derivative Cheney [2013] (if they exist)
to characterize how a small change of g˜ results in a change in Q˜∗.
From Lemma 1.3 and Theorem 1.2, we know that Q-learning algorithm
converges to the unique fixed point of F˜ and that f : g˜ 7→ Q˜∗ is uniformly
Lipschitz continuous. Also, it is easy to see that the inverse of f , denoted by
f−1, exists since given Q˜∗, g˜ is uniquely decided by the relation F˜ (Q) = Q.
Furthermore, by the relation F˜ (Q) = Q, we know f is both injective and sur-
jective and hence a bijection which can be simply shown by arguing that given
different g˜, the solution of F˜ (Q) = Q must be different. This fact informs that
there is a one-to-one, onto correspondence between g˜ and Q˜∗. One should note
that the mapping f : Rn×|A| → Rn×|A| is not uniformly Fre´chet differentiable
on Rn×|A| due to the min operator inside the relation F˜ (Q) = Q. However, for
any policy µ, f is Fre´chet differentiable on f−1(Vµ) which is an open set and
connected due to the fact that Vµ is open and connected (every convex set is
connected) and f is continuous. In the next lemma, we show that f is Fre´chet
differentiable on f−1(Vw) and the derivative is constant.
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Lemma 1.5: The map f : Rn×|A| → Rn×|A| is Fre´chet differentiable on
f−1(Vµ) for any policy µ and the Fre´chet derivative of f at any point g˜ ∈ Vµ,
denoted by f ′(g˜), is a linear bounded map G : Rn×|A| → Rn×|A| that does not
depend on g˜, and Gh is given as
[Gh]i,u = αP
T
iu(I − αPµ)−1hµ + h(i, u) (1.16)
for every i ∈ S, u ∈ A, where Piu = (pi1(u), · · · , pin(u)), Pµ := [Pµ]i,j =
pij(µ(i)).
The proof of Lemma 1.5 is provided in Huang and Zhu [2019b]. We can
see that f is Fre´chet differentiable on f−1(Vµ) and the derivative is constant,
i.e., f ′(g˜) = G for any g˜ ∈ f−1(Vµ). Note that G lies in the space of all linear
mappings that maps Rn×|A| to itself and G is determined only by the discount
factor α and the transition kernel P of the MDP problem. The region where the
differentiability may fail is f−1(Rn×|A|\(∪µVµ)), where Rn×|A|\(∪µVµ) is the
set {Q : ∃i,∃u 6= u′, Q(i, u) = Q(i, u′) = minv Q(i, v)}. This set contains the
places where a change of policy happens, i.e., Q(i, u) and Q(i, u′) are both the
lowest value among the ith row of Q. Also, due to the fact that f is Lipschitz,
by Rademacher’s theorem, f is differentiable almost everywhere (w.r.t. the
Lebesgue measure).
Remark 1.3: One can view f as a ‘piece-wise linear function’ in the norm
vector space Rn×|A|. Actually, if the adversary can only falsify the cost at one
state-control pair, say (i, u), while costs at other pairs are fixed, then for every
j ∈ S, v ∈ A, the function g˜(i, u) 7→ [Q˜∗]j,v is a piece-wise linear function.
Given any g ∈ f−1(Vµ), if an adversary falsifies the cost g by injecting value
30
h, i.e., g˜ = g + h, the adversary can see how the falsification causes a change
in Q-values. To be more specific, if Q∗ is the Q-values learned from cost g by
Q-learning algorithm (1.7), after the falsification g˜, the Q-value learned from
Q-learning algorithm (1.12) becomes Q˜∗ = Q∗ + Gh if g˜ ∈ f−1(Vµ). Then,
an adversary who knows the system model can utilize (1.16) to find a way of
falsification h such that Q˜∗ can be driven to approach a desired set Vµ† . One
difficulty is to see whether g˜ ∈ f−1(Vµ) because the set f−1(Vµ) is now implicit
expressed. Thus, we resort to the following theorem.
Theorem 1.4: Let Q˜∗ ∈ Rn×|A| be the Q-values learned from the Q-learning
algorithm (1.12) with the falsified cost g˜ ∈ Rn×|A|. Then Q˜∗ ∈ Vµ† if and only
if the falsified cost signals g˜ designed by the adversary satisfy the following
conditions
g˜(i, u) > (1i − αPiu)T (I − αPµ†)−1g˜µ† . (1.17)
for all i ∈ S, u ∈ A\{µ†(i)}, where 1i ∈ Rn a vector with n components whose
ith component is 1 and other components are 0.
With the results in Theorem 1.4, we can characterize the set f−1(Vµ). Ele-
ments in f−1(Vµ) have to satisfy the conditions given in (1.17). Also, Theorem
1.4 indicates that if an adversary intends to mislead the agent to learn policy
µ†, the falsified cost g˜ has to satisfy the conditions specified in (1.17).
If an adversary can only falsify at certain states S˜ ⊂ S, the adversary may
not be able to manipulate the agent to learn µ†. Next, we study under what
conditions the adversary can make the agent learn µ† by only manipulating
the costs on S˜. Without loss of generality, suppose that the adversary can
only falsify the cost at a subset of states S˜ = {1, 2, ..., |S˜|}. We rewrite the
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conditions given in (1.17) into a more compact form:
g˜u ≥ (I − αPu)(I − αPµ†)−1g˜µ† , ∀ u ∈ A, (1.18)
where g˜u = (g˜(1, u), . . . , g˜(n, u)), g˜µ† =
(
g˜(1, µ†(1)), g˜(2, µ†(2)), . . . , g˜(n, µ†(n))
)
and Pu = [Pu]i,j = pij(u). The equality only holds for one component of the
vector, i.e., the i-th component satisfying µ(i) = u. Partition the vector g˜u and
g˜µ† in (1.18) into two parts, the part where the adversary can falsify the cost
denoted by g˜falu , g˜
fal
µ† ∈ R|S˜| and the part where the adversary cannot falsify
gtrueu , g
true
µ† ∈ Rn−|S˜|. Then (1.18) can be written as
 g˜falu
gtrueu
 ≥
 Ru Yu
Mu Nu

 g˜falµ†
gtrue
µ†
 , ∀ u ∈ A, (1.19)
where  Ru Yu
Mu Nu
 := (I − αPu)(I − αPµ†)−1, ∀ u ∈ A
and Ru ∈ RS˜×S˜ , Yu ∈ R|S˜|×(n−|S˜|),Mu ∈ R(n−|S˜|)×|S˜|, Nu ∈ R(n−|S˜|)×(n−|S˜|).
If the adversary aims to mislead the agent to learn µ†, the adversary needs
to design g˜falu , u ∈ A such that the conditions in (1.19) hold. The following re-
sults state that under some conditions on the transition probability, no matter
what the true costs are, the adversary can find proper g˜falu , u ∈ A such that
conditions (1.19) are satisfied. For i ∈ S\S˜, if µ(i) = u, we remove the rows
of Mu that correspond to the state i ∈ S\S˜. Denote the new matrix after the
row removals by M¯u.
Proposition 1.1: Define H := [M¯ ′u1 M¯
′
u2 · · · M¯ ′u|A| ]′ ∈ R(|A|(n−|S˜|)−|S˜|)×|S˜|.
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If there exists x ∈ R|S˜| such that Hx < 0, i.e., the column space of H intersects
the negative orthant of R|A|(n−|S˜|)−|S˜|, then for any true cost, the adversary can
find g˜falu , u ∈ A such that conditions (1.19) hold.
The proof can be found in Huang and Zhu [2019b]. Note that H only
depends on the transition probability and the discount factor, if an adversary
who knows the system model can only falsify cost signals at states denoted by
S˜, an adversary can check if the range space of H intersects with the negative
orthant of R|A|(n−|S˜|) or not. If it does, the adversary can mislead the agent to
learn µ† by falsifying costs at a subset of state space no matter what the true
cost is.
Remark 1.4: To check whether the condition on H is true or not, one has
to resort to Gordan’s theorem Broyden [2001]: Either Hx < 0 has a solution
x, or HT y = 0 has a nonzero solution y with y ≥ 0. The adversary can use
linear/convex programming software to check if this is the case. For example,
by solving
min
y∈R|A|(n−|S˜|)
‖HT y‖ s.t. ‖y‖ = 1, y ≥ 0, (1.20)
the adversary can know whether the condition about H given in Proposition
1.1 is true or not. If the minimum of (1.20) is positive, there exists x such that
Hx < 0. The adversary can select g˜fal
µ† = λx and choose a sufficiently large λ
to make sure that conditions (1.19) hold, which means an adversary can make
the agent learn the policy µ† by falsifying costs at a subset of state space no
matter what the true costs are.
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1.4. Case Study
Here, we consider TD learning on random walk. Given a policy µ, an MDP
can be considered as a Markov cost process, or MCP. In this MCP, we have
n = 20 states. The transition digram of the MCP is given in Fig. 1.2. At state
i = ik, k = 2, 3, . . . , n − 1, the process proceed either left to ik−1 or right to
ik+1, with equal probability. The transition at states from i2 to in−1 is similar
to symmetric one-dimensional random walk. At state i1, the process proceed to
state i2 with probability 1/2 or stays at the same state with equal probability.
At state in, the probabilities of transition to in−1 and staying at in are both
1
2 . That is, we have pikik+1(µ(ik)) = pikik−1(µ(ik)) =
1
2 for k = 2, 3, . . . , n − 1,
pi1i1 = pi1i2 =
1
2 and pinin = pinin−1 =
1
2 . The cost at state ik is set to be k if
k ≤ 10 and 21− k if k > 10. That is
g(ik, µ(ik)) =

k if k ≤ 10
21− k else
.
We consider the discount factor α = 0.9. The task here is to use approximate
TD(λ) learning algorithm to esitimate and approximate the cost-to-go function
Jµ of this MCP. We consider a linear parametrization of the form
J˜(i, r) = r(3)i2 + r(2)i+ r(1), (1.21)
and r = (r(1), r(2), r(3)) ∈ R3. Suppose the learning agent updates rt based
on TD(λ) learning algorithm (1.3) and (1.4) and tries to find an estimate of
Jµ. We simulate the MCP and obtain a trajectory that long enough and its
associated cost signals. We need an infinite long trajectory ideally. But here, we
set the length of the trajectory to be 105. We run respectively TD(1) and TD(0)
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on the same simulated trajectory based on rules given in (1.3) and (1.4). The
black line indicates the cost-to-go function of the MCP. The blue markers are
the approximations of the cost-to-go function obtained by following the TD(λ)
algorithm (1.3) and (1.4) with λ = 1 and λ = 0. We can see that J˜TD(1) and
J˜TD(0) is a quadratic function of i as we set in (1.21). Both J˜TD(1) and J˜TD(0)
can serve a fairly good approximation of Jµ as we can see. The dimension of
the parameters we need to update goes from n = 20 in the TD(λ) algorithm
(1.2) to K = 3 in the approximation counterpart (1.3) which is more efficient
computationally.
Figure 1.2: The diagram of the MCP task with 20 states denoted by i1, . . . , i20.
Suppose the adversary aims to deteriorate the TD(λ) algorithm by stealthily
manipulating the cost signals. Suppose the adversary can only manipulate the
cost signals at state i20 and the manipulated cost is g˜(i20, µ(i20)) = 20. We can
see from Fig. 1.3 that the TD(λ) learning under manipulated cost signals fails
to provide accurate approximation of Jµ. Although only the cost signal at one
state is manipulated, the approximation of cost-to-go function at other states
can also be largely deviated from the accurate value.
We generate 100 random falsifications denoted by η. Note that η = g˜−g. For
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Figure 1.3: The cost-to-go function of a given policy, denoted by Jµ; the
approximations of the cost-to-go function under true cost signals which is marked
blue, denoted by J˜ ; the approximations of the cost-to-go function under manipulated
cost signals which is marked red, denoted by J˜†; The subscript TD(1) and TD(0)
denote the TD parameter λ is set to be 1 and 0 respectively.
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Figure 1.4: The approximated TD(1) learned from 100 random falsifications of the
costs. For each falsification, we plot the distance of the falsification and the
approximation error of its associated approximate of Jµ. the blue line is a
demonstration of the bound developed in (1.11).
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each falsification, we plot the norm ‖η‖D of η and its associated approximation
error ‖Φ′r˜∗−Jµ‖D and the pair is marked by black circle in Fig. 1.4. Note that
r˜∗ is the parameter learned by the agent using TD(1) learning algorithm (1.8)
under the falsified costs. The blue line describes the map ‖η‖D 7→ 11−α‖η‖D +
‖ΠJµ − Jµ‖D. The results in Fig. 1.4 collaborate the results we proved in
Theorem 1.1. This demonstrate how the falsification on cost signals in only
one state can affect the approximated value function on every single state and
how the resulted learning error is bounded.
For case study of Q-learning with falsified costs, one can refer to Huang
and Zhu [2019b].
1.5. Conclusion
In this chapter, we have discussed the potential threats in RL and a general
framework has been introduced to study RL under deceptive falsifications of
cost signals where a number of attack models have been presented. We have
provided theoretical underpinnings for understanding the fundamental limits
and performance bounds on the attack and the defense in RL systems. We
have shown that in TD(λ) the approximation learned from the manipulated
costs has an approximation error bounded by a constant times the magnitude
of the attack. The effect of the adversarial attacks does not depend on the
choice of λ. In Q-learning, we have characterized a robust region within which
the adversarial attacks cannot achieve its objective. The robust region of the
cost can be utilized by both offensive and defensive sides. An RL agent can
leverage the robust region to evaluate the robustness to malicious falsifications.
An adversary can leverage it to assess the attainability of his attack objectives.
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Conditions given in Theorem 1.4 provide a fundamental understanding of the
possible strategic adversarial behavior of the adversary. Theorem 1.1 helps
understand the attainability of an adversary’s objective. Future work would
focus on investigating a particular attack model and develop countermeasures
to the attacks on cost signals.
Bibliography
Itamar Arel, Cong Liu, Tom Urbanik, and Airton G Kohls. Reinforcement
learning-based multi-agent system for network traffic signal control. IET
Intelligent Transport Systems, 4(2):128–135, 2010.
Vahid Behzadan and Arslan Munir. The faults in our pi stars: Security is-
sues and open challenges in deep reinforcement learning. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1810.10369, 2018.
Vahid Behzadan and Arslan Munir. Adversarial reinforcement learning frame-
work for benchmarking collision avoidance mechanisms in autonomous vehi-
cles. IEEE Intelligent Transportation Systems Magazine, 2019.
Dimitri P Bertsekas and John N Tsitsiklis. Neuro-dynamic programming, vol-
ume 5. Athena Scientific Belmont, MA, 1996.
Vivek S Borkar. Stochastic approximation: a dynamical systems viewpoint,
volume 48. Springer, 2009.
Vivek S Borkar and Sean P Meyn. The ode method for convergence of stochas-
tic approximation and reinforcement learning. SIAM Journal on Control and
Optimization, 38(2):447–469, 2000.
39
CG Broyden. On theorems of the alternative. Optimization methods and
software, 16(1-4):101–111, 2001.
Ward Cheney. Analysis for applied mathematics, volume 208. Springer Science
& Business Media, 2013.
Jack Clark and Dario Amodei. Faulty reward functions in the wild. URL
https://blog. openai. com/faulty-reward-functions, 2016.
Damien Ernst, Mevludin Glavic, and Louis Wehenkel. Power systems stabil-
ity control: reinforcement learning framework. IEEE transactions on power
systems, 19(1):427–435, 2004.
Tom Everitt, Victoria Krakovna, Laurent Orseau, Marcus Hutter, and Shane
Legg. Reinforcement learning with a corrupted reward channel. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1705.08417, 2017.
Linan Huang and Quanyan Zhu. Adaptive honeypot engagement through rein-
forcement learning of semi-markov decision processes. In International Con-
ference on Decision and Game Theory for Security, pages 196–216. Springer,
2019a.
Yunhan Huang and Quanyan Zhu. Deceptive reinforcement learning under
adversarial manipulations on cost signals. In International Conference on
Decision and Game Theory for Security, pages 217–237. Springer, 2019b.
Jens Kober, J Andrew Bagnell, and Jan Peters. Reinforcement learning in
robotics: A survey. The International Journal of Robotics Research, 32(11):
1238–1274, 2013.
Erwin Kreyszig. Introductory functional analysis with applications, volume 1.
wiley New York, 1978.
40
Yen-Chen Lin, Zhang-Wei Hong, Yuan-Hong Liao, Meng-Li Shih, Ming-Yu Liu,
and Min Sun. Tactics of adversarial attack on deep reinforcement learning
agents. arXiv preprint arXiv:1703.06748, 2017.
Yuzhe Ma, Xuezhou Zhang, Wen Sun, and Jerry Zhu. Policy poisoning in
batch reinforcement learning and control. In Advances in Neural Information
Processing Systems, pages 14543–14553, 2019.
Volodymyr Mnih, Koray Kavukcuoglu, David Silver, Andrei A Rusu, Joel Ve-
ness, Marc G Bellemare, Alex Graves, Martin Riedmiller, Andreas K Fidje-
land, Georg Ostrovski, et al. Human-level control through deep reinforce-
ment learning. Nature, 518(7540):529, 2015.
Richard S Sutton, Andrew G Barto, et al. Introduction to reinforcement learn-
ing, volume 2. MIT press Cambridge, 1998.
Ah-Hwee Tan, Ning Lu, and Dan Xiao. Integrating temporal difference meth-
ods and self-organizing neural networks for reinforcement learning with de-
layed evaluative feedback. IEEE Transactions on Neural Networks, 19(2):
230–244, 2008.
John N Tsitsiklis and Benjamin Van Roy. Analysis of temporal-diffference
learning with function approximation. In Advances in neural information
processing systems, pages 1075–1081, 1997.
Jingkang Wang, Yang Liu, and Bo Li. Reinforcement learning with perturbed
rewards. arXiv preprint arXiv:1810.01032, 2018.
Christopher JCH Watkins and Peter Dayan. Q-learning. Machine learning, 8
(3-4):279–292, 1992.
41
Christopher John Cornish Hellaby Watkins. Learning from delayed rewards.
1989.
Zhiheng Xu and Quanyan Zhu. A cyber-physical game framework for secure
and resilient multi-agent autonomous systems. In 2015 54th IEEE Confer-
ence on Decision and Control (CDC), pages 5156–5161. IEEE, 2015.
Quanyan Zhu and Tamer Bas¸ar. Dynamic policy-based ids configuration. In
Proceedings of the 48h IEEE Conference on Decision and Control (CDC)
held jointly with 2009 28th Chinese Control Conference, pages 8600–8605.
IEEE, 2009.
42
